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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

JAMES WEBB,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant/Respondent,

:

v.

:

THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a division of
the State of Utah,

:

Case No. 20040282

Defendant/Appellee/Petitioner,
PARK PLAZA CONDOMINIUM OWNERS*
ASSOCIATION, a Utah NoiWProfit
:
Corporation, and JONETTE WEBSTER,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The petition in this case was taken from the decision entered by the Utah Court of
Appeals in Webb v. University of Utah. 2004 UT App 56, 88 P.3d 664. The court of
appeals reviewed an order of the Third Judicial District Court dismissing the negligence
claim brought by plaintiff James Webb (Webb) against defendant University of Utah (the
University) based on a slip and fall. The court of appeals reversed the district court,
holding that Webb need not show a special duty owed to him as an individual in order to
recover against the University. This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of
the court of appeals under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. The court of appeals erred in holding that, in the absence of a special
relationship, the University can be held liable in negligence for injury sustained by a
student on a field trip.
2. The court of appeals erred in concluding that the allegations of the complaint
suffice to establish a special relationship between Webb and the University.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
There are no determinative provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, or
regulations which control the circumstances present in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
Webb filed his complaint in this case in September, 1999 (R. 1-3) (Addendum A,

attached), alleging, as to the University, that it negligently conducted a scheduled class
field trip by "taking the class into a dangerous area," resulting in injuries to him (R. 2,
% 12). The claim also alleged that Webb's injuries were caused by his classmate,
codefendant Jonette Webster, who "slipped on the ice, and while attempting to steady
herself, caused Plaintiff to slip and fall on the concrete" (R. 2, ^| 11). The University
moved to dismiss Webb's claim against it under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (R. 18-26) on
the ground that, under Beach v. University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986), the
University was under no special duty to Webb that would confer liability. After Webb's
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response (R. 35-38) and the University's reply (R. 47-57), the district court heard the
motion (R. 72), which was granted by order entered January 31. 2000 (R. 73-75)
(Addendum EL attached).
On February 28, 2000, Webb filed a notice of appeal (R. 79-80) from the district
court's order dismissing the claims against the University with prejudice (R. 73-75). This
Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice as taken from a non-final order. See Webb
v. Univ. of Utah. No. 20000181-SC (R. 87-89) (Addendum C, attached). Webb then
moved the district court to certify the order of dismissal as final pursuant to Utah R. Civ.
P. 54(b) (R. 90-96). On October 11, 2000, after the judge granted the Rule 54(b) motion
by minute entry (R. 99-100) but before an order was entered, Webb filed a second notice
of appeal (R. 111-12). Once the order was entered on October 24, 2000 (R. 115-16), a
third notice of appeal was filed on November 1, 2000 (R. 117-18). This Court transferred
both the second and third appeals to the court of appeals for disposition, where they were
consolidated and dismissed for improper certification. See Webb v Univ. of Utah, Nos.
20000881-CA and 20000980-CA (R. 139-40) (Addendum D, attached).
Following the dismissal of the last party remaining before the district court by
order entered November 13, 2002 (R. 150-52), Webb filed his fourth and final notice of
appeal on November 20, 2002 (R. 153-54). This Court transferred the appeal to the court
of appeals (see Appellate Docket, Webb v. Univ. of Utah, No. 20020985, at 12/23/2002).
Following briefing and argument, the court of appeals entered its decision on March 11,
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2004, reversing the district court's dismissal of the University (R. 73-75) and remanding
the case for further action (2004 UT App 56, ^1 11) (Addendum E, attached). The court of
appeals held that M[t]he University owes its students the duty to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care when it directs students to engage in specific activities as a part of its
educational instruction" (id.). The court also observed that "were a special relationship
required in this case, the facts alleged by Webb are sufficient to establish" one (id,, % 10
n.6). On April 9, 2004, the University petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari, which
was granted by order of June 10, 2004.
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
The relevant facts in this case are few. On March 7, 1998, while he was a student

at the University of Utah. Webb participated in a scheduled class field trip which was
conducted outdoors on non-University property (R. 2,ffl|6-7 and 9). During the field trip,
a fellow student slipped, causing Webb to fall and become injured (R. 2-3, ^ft| 11 and 15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In reversing the district court's dismissal of Webb's claims against the University,
the court of appeals held that (1) the public duty doctrine does not apply to this case, and
(2) even if it does, the allegations of the complaint established a special relationship,
allowing Webb's negligence claim to go forward. Neither of these conclusions finds
support in precedent. This Court has consistently held that absent a duty owed to the
plaintiff specifically, a state defendant bears no liability for harms due to negligence. The
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court of appeals' decision reduces the state to the role of an insurer—a determination
fraught with fiscal and political ramifications of the kind the legislature is in the best
position to weigh.
If taking a class into a "dangerous area" is enough to create a special relationship,
the result is to eviscerate the public duty doctrine by making every relationship special.
Given the complaint's admission that Webb's injury was directly caused by his fellow
student's attempt to steady herself, his relationship to the University is indistinguishable
from that of his student colleagues. Moreover, accepting a plaintiffs mere presence at the
scene of his injury as adequate to create a special duty fosters the kind of artful pleading
that this Court has consistently rejected.
Because the court of appeals' decision is inconsistent with both the reasoning and
result of prior cases, it merits reversal here.
ARGUMENT
Standard of Review: "On a writ of certiorari, we review the decision of the court
of appeals, not that of the district court, and apply the same standard of review used by
the court of appeals." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell. 966 P.2d 852, 855 (Utah 1998).
The court of appeals applied a correctness standard "[bjecause the propriety of a dismissal
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a question of law." Warner v. DMG
Color. Inc.. 2000 UT 102, ^j 6, 20 P.3d 868; consequently, this Court also applies a
correctness standard. "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether
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it accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review/1
Clark v. Clark. 2001 UT 44, ^ 8, 27 P.3d 538.
L THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A STATE ENTITY AND AN
INDIVIDUAL IS REQUIRED FOR LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE.
It is well settled that under Utah law,
[t]o prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish four essential
elements: (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) that the
defendant breached that duty, (3) that the breach of duty was the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (4) that the plaintiff in fact suffered
injuries or damages.
Hunsaker v. State. 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993); accord Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't of
Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah App. 1992). This Court recognized in Beach the
indispensability of the duty element: "One essential element of a negligence action is a
duty of reasonable care owed to the plaintiff by defendant. Absent a showing of a duty,
Beach cannot recover." Beach, 726 P.2d at 415 (internal citations omitted). Moreover,
"[t]he issue of whether a duty exists is a question of law to be determined by the court."
Hunsaker, 870 P.2d at 897. In Hunsaker, the Court held that "[t]he State defendants in
the instant case owed no duty to Hunsaker or the other plaintiffs under the standards set
out in our prior decisions. No facts are alleged here that could bring into play the special
relationship duty which would be a necessary premise for any negligence liability of the
State actors." Id, at 897 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Thus, in any claim of
negligence against a state actor, the element of duty cannot be fulfilled in the absence of a
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special relationship between plaintiff and defendant. This principle is embodied in the
public duty doctrine, which, in this Court's words,
provides that although a government entity owes a general duty to all
members of the public, that duty does not impose a specific duty of care on
the government with respect to individuals who may be harmed by
governmental action or inaction, unless there is some specific connection
between the government agency and the individuals that makes it
reasonable to impose a duty.
Day v. State, 1999 UT 46, U 12, 980 P.2d 1171. As enumerated in Day,
[a] special relationship can be established (1) by a statute intended to
protect a specific class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member from a
particular type of harm; (2) when a government agent undertakes specific
action to protect a person or property; (3) by government actions that
reasonably induce detrimental reliance by a member of the public; and (4)
under certain circumstances, when the agency has actual custody of the
plaintiff or of a third person who causes harm to the plaintiff.
Id at H 13.
None of the Day factors is present in this case. Webb has pointed to no statute
intended to protect a class of which he is a member from injury incurred in a slip and fall.
He has not alleged that the University took specific action to protect him from a slip and
fall. He has not shown detrimental reliance on any University action intended to prevent
him from slipping and falling. Nor has he shown that the University had actual custody
of either Webb or the fellow student he claims caused his fall and consequent injury.
The court of appeals' decision acknowledges that in order to prevail on a
negligence claim, a plaintiff is required to establish that the defendant owes him a duty of
care. However, the court Mdisagree[s] that Webb must demonstrate a special relationship
7

with the University" (2004 UT App 56 at 1j 6) to establish that duty. The court's
disagreement and resulting decision conflict with the public duty doctrine as articulated in
numerous precedents from its own and this Court's jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that n[f]or a government agency and its agents to be liable
for negligently caused injury suffered by a member of the public, the plaintiff must show
a breach of duty owed him as an individual, not merely the breach of an obligation owed
to the general public at large by the governmental official." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149,
151 (Utah 1989). The court of appeals has likewise recognized that "when the
government deals generally with the welfare of all, it does so without a duty to anyone,
unless there is a 'special relationship' between the government and the individual."
Cannon v. Univ. of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App. 1993). Utah's appellate courts
have consistently applied this principle in a variety of factual contexts to numerous
negligence-based claims against governmental defendants.
In Madsen v. Borthick, the plaintiffs sued the defendant state actors for failing to
discharge their statutory duties in licensing and supervising a finance company. This
Court, finding no duty owed to the plaintiffs as individuals, reiterated the standard
articulated in Ferree that "[t]o hold a government agency or one of its agents liable for
negligence or gross negligence, a plaintiff cannot recover for the breach of a duty owed to
the general public, but must show that a duty is owed to him or her as an individual."
Madsen v. Borthick, 850 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1993).
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In Owens v. Garfield. 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989), Owens selected Garfield as a
daytime babysitter for her young son. After the child sustained serious and permanent
injuries at Garfield's hands, Owens sued, among others, the state and county for failing to
warn her about prior child abuse investigations of, and charges against, Garfield. This
Court rejected Owens1 claim, finding the public entities had no special relationship with
either Owens or Garfield on which liability to Owens could be premised.
In Rollins v. State, no special relationship was found to support liability of the
Utah State Hospital when one of its patients left hospital grounds, stole a car, and killed
another driver when he lost control of the stolen vehicle. Rollins v. State. 813 P.2d 1156,
1161 (Utah 1991). Even the dissent agreed that "[traditionally, a government tort-feasor
has been accorded a special status with regard to the duty question." 813 P.2d at 1165
(Durham, J., concurring and dissenting). As the dissent further explained, "Under the
public duty doctrine, liability against a government for torts committed against an
individual must be premised on the violation of a special or particular duty owed the
individual plaintiff rather than on the violation of a general duty owed the public as a
whole." kf Nothing in the doctrine, as articulated in appellate decisions and
acknowledged in the Rollins dissent, limits the applicability of the public duty doctrine to
particular kinds of negligence; rather, "[u]nder the doctrine, a duty to all is a duty to
none." IdL The public duty doctrine is entrenched in Utah appellate decisions. See Obrav
v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 19, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971) (finding the duty of a public
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sheriff to investigate a crime is "not pursuable by an individual since the public official's
duty is to the public"); Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 539 (quoting the language from the Rollins
dissent); Cannon. 866 P.2d at 588; Day, 1999 UT 46, H 12.
The court of appeals in the present case discounted these precedents as
inapplicable because the duty it held the University owed to Webb "is not a duty to
protect, but rather the University's duty not to act negligently in providing instruction."
2004 UT App 56, % 6. The court concluded that "[t]herefore, the special duty doctrine
relied upon by the University is not helpful." IdL Prior case law does not support the
distinction drawn by the court of appeals; in fact, that court's own precedent belies it.
The court of appeals explained the rationale behind the public duty doctrine in
Cannon v. University of Utah. The Cannon plaintiffs were struck by a vehicle in a
marked crosswalk while crossing the street from a University-owned parking lot to attend
a basketball game on University property. Although the University had assigned two
police officers to assist in traffic control at the crosswalk, the officers were sitting in their
car when the plaintiffs crossed. Finding the University owed no duty to the plaintiffs
beyond that owed to the public at large, the court affirmed summary judgment for the
University. In explaining that the public duty doctrine precluded liability, the court
observed that "[ajbsent such a doctrine, the government would be discouraged from
adequately providing any general protections or services for the public." Cannon, 866
P.2d at 589 (emphasis added). The language of the court's decision, rather than
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distinguishing between a state defendant's positive acts and failures to act. embraces both.
By encompassing both positive acts and omissions to act, the public duty doctrine assures
that outcomes will be based not on the artful characterization of a claim, but on its
operative facts.1
This Court's language in Day also belies the court of appeals' attempted distinction.
Analyzing the public duty doctrine, the Day court observed that a general duty to the
public at large "does not impose a specific duty of care on the government with respect to
individuals who may be harmed by governmental action or inaction" 1999 UT 46, ^| 12
(emphasis added). Under the court of appeals' analysis, the government's liability for
negligence would depend completely on whether the claimed harm is characterized as
action or inaction, in direct contradiction to the standard articulated in Day. A standard

*Utah appellate cases have consistently rejected the recharacterization of claims to
avoid valid defenses or to obtain tactical advantages. See Schwenke v. Smith, 942 P.2d
335, 336-37 (Utah 1997) (rejecting recharacterization of claim based on attorney
discipline as action in fraud to avoid jurisdiction of Utah Supreme Court); Ledfors v.
Emery County Sch. DisU 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993) (rejecting recharacterization
of claim arising from battery as arising from failure to supervise in order to avoid
governmental immunity defense); Bullock v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 966 P.2d 1215, 1217
(Utah App. 1998) (rejecting recharacterization of claim for recovery of property as
contract claim to avoid statute of limitations defense); DeVilliers v. Utah County. 882
P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah App. 1994) (rejecting recharacterization of claim based on plat
approval as one based on negligent road design in order to avoid governmental immunity
defense). Notably, in DeVilliers, one judge would have "decide[d] this case based on the
absence of a 'special duty' owed to this particular plaintiff by these defendants." 882 P.2d
at 1167 (Bench, Judge, concurring in result).
11

permitting different outcomes on the basis of artful pleading elevates form over substance
to reach a result not supported by decided case law.
Both of Utah's appellate courts have recognized that their decisions are constrained
by legislative choices. The court of appeals, noting in Lamarr that M[t]he public duty
doctrine is a creature of common law/' stated. "Lamarr basically argues the legislature
abrogated the common law doctrine in enacting the Governmental Immunity Act.
Although the supreme court in Ferree and Rollins expressly rejects this argument, we
note the legislature could abrogate that common law doctrine if it chose to do so in
specific terms." Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 539 n.4. The Lamarr court cited Norton v.
Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 12 (Utah 1991) for the principle that the "legislature has [the] last
word with respect to tort law." 828 P.2d at 539 n.4. At no time in this case has Webb
cited to a Utah statute abrogating the public duty doctrine or a binding precedent asserting
its abrogation. As the Court has recognized in the line of Governmental Immunity Act
cases arising from assault and battery, plaintiffs who find themselves without a remedy
may, like Webb, find the result unconscionable, but their remedy, like Webb's, lies with
the legislature, not with the courts. See S.H. v. State, 865 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Utah 1993)
("Plaintiffs may find the immunity given by the legislature unconscionable, but their
remedy lies with that same legislature."); see also Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1167 (observing
that the court is "constrained by the plain language of the [Governmental Immunity] Act
and our prior case law" despite "the legislature's power to permit all plaintiffs to whom
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the government owes a duty of care based on a special relationship to bring suit for
injuries arising out of a breach of that duty") (emphasis added).
If the court of appeals' decision is sustained here, the University, and other state
agencies, will become the guarantors of public safety regardless of the circumstances
producing injury. Just as Cannon suggests, the end result may be a curtailment in stateprovided services. For example, if the University owes a duty to all spectators attending
its sports events—absent a special relationship—it may choose not to provide traffic
control services near the venue, an outcome that may increase the risk of harm to the
public at large. If it owes a duty to any adult student on a field trip for any injury
sustained during the trip—without a showing of some factor that would entitle him to a
higher level of protection than other students—the University may respond by curtailing
field trips and other educational exercises because the duty, as this Court explained in
Beach v. University of Utah, is "realistically incapable of performance, or . ..
fundamentally at odds with the nature of the parties' relationship." Beach, 726 P.2d at
418. The court of appeals' holding that a duty exists in the present case, even in the
absence of a special relationship, fundamentally alters the character of the University
experience. Moreover, because the court of appeals' decision articulates no limiting
principle, allowing the decision to stand threatens the state fisc, diverting resources from
programs and services for public benefit to individual claims for damages based on
unforeseeable dangers and unpreventable accidents. This Court's precedents show that
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the weighing of factors on which to predicate such expansive public liability is a function
entrusted to the legislature.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WEBB AND THE UNIVERSITY.
Although the court of appeals held that it was not necessary for Webb to show a
special relationship with the University in order to establish the existence of a duty, it
observed, in a footnote, "that were a special relationship required in this case, the facts
alleged by Webb are sufficient to establish a special relationship." 2004 UT App 56 at
f 10 n.6. As the basis for this conclusion, the court stated, "Where one party controls
another party's acts, a special relationship exists because the controlling party 'assumes
responsibility for another's safety or deprives another of his or her normal opportunities
for self-protection.'" kf (quoting Beach, 726 P.2d at 415). The court cited no facts from
the complaint to support its conclusion that the University assumed responsibility for
Webb's safety or deprived him of his normal opportunities for self-protection. Merely
exposing him to an allegedly dangerous area does not, under Beach, establish that the
University exerted control over his safety or actions.
The Beach case involved a student who was injured on a required overnight,
University-sponsored field trip. Analyzing the duty element of Beach's negligence claim,
this Court held that because Beach had not established that she was distinguishable, in
any relevant particular, from the rest of the students on the field trip, the University had
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no special relationship with her on which a duty could be premised. Consequently, the
University had no liability for her injuries.
In deviating from the Beach analysis, the court of appeals' opinion focused on a
single factual distinction between the Beach and Webb cases while ignoring relevant
similarities. The court stated that M[t]he crucial difference between Beach and the facts in
this case is that Webb's fall occurred while Webb was acting pursuant to instructions
given by the University during course work. The University directed Webb to cross the
condominium complex, whereas Beach was acting on her own when she fell." Webb,
2004 UT App 56 at ^ 8. The allegations of the complaint do not support the court's
statement. The complaint alleges only that the University took the class "into a dangerous
area." R. 2 at ^J 12. Nothing in the complaint speaks to crossing the condominium
complex, let alone taking any particular route pursuant to direction by the University.
Instead, it appears from the complaint that the students were simply standing at the time
of the accident: "While standing on the sidewalk, Defendant Jonette Webster slipped on
the ice, and while attempting to stead herself, caused Plaintiff to slip and fall on the
concrete." R. 2 at ^j 11. Common to both the Beach and Webb cases is the undisputed
fact that it was not the exposure to an allegedly dangerous area that caused the plaintiffs'
injuries, but circumstances over which the University had no control: Beach's own
actions and Webb's classmate's fall.
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Unaddressed by the court of appeals' opinion in the present case is the fact that
even though the Beach defendants were on notice that Beach, unlike Webb, was
distinguishable from her fellow students in several ways, the distinctions were not
significant enough to set her apart for purposes of a special relationship. She lacked
experience in the relevant activity, camping. Unlike her fellow students, on a prior field
trip she had been discovered by the instructor to be asleep in the bushes near camp after
becoming disoriented following an incident of underage alcohol consumption. This Court
nonetheless affirmed summary judgment for the University in Beach, holding these facts
insufficient to confer any enforceable duty on the University. Webb, in contrast to Beach,
articulated no facts distinguishing him from the other students on the field trip during
which he was injured.
The facts of Beach illuminate the standard needed to show a special relationship
and enforceable duty. In Beach, the district court "assumed arguendo that the University
had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect and supervise Beach, but concluded that
there was no breach of that duty." Beach, 726 P.2d at 415. As this Court observed on
review,
At the time of the final field trip, Beach had attended other field trips
and had had no further incidents. She evidenced the judgment and skills of
any normal twenty-year-old college student. There was nothing to suggest
that she was not in good physical condition; in fact, on the final trip she
joined several other students in rappelling from rocks located just above the
area where she was later injured.

16

Beach, 726 P.2d at 416. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that "[ujnder these
circumstances, we conclude as a matter of law that Beach's situation was not
distinguishable from that of the other students on the trip; therefore, no special
relationship arose between the University and Beach." Id. The Court concluded that
M

[b]ecause no special relationship existed, the University had no affirmative obligation to

protect or supervise her and no duty was breached." Id.
Applying the Beach standard to the facts of the present case, there is even less
reason to hold the University liable for Webb's injuries than for Beach's. It is doubtful
that the public sidewalk on the condominium site where Webb was injured was inherently
more dangerous than the rugged terrain to which Beach was exposed. Webb's complaint
articulates no historical facts that could possibly have put the University on notice that he
was in need of special assistance or was otherwise distinguishable from the other students
on the field trip. Under the analytical framework of Beach, the University cannot be held
liable to Webb for his unfortunate, but unforeseeable, accident, because a special
relationship is absent.
In reaching its decision in this case, the court of appeals relied in part on Beach's
citation to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314(A) (1964) to show a special relationship
based on the court's view that the University had asserted control of Webb (see 2004 UT
App 56 at % 10 n.6). However, its reliance is misplaced in light of this Court's
modification of the Restatement's approach. In Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
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231 (Utah 1993), the Court explained that it did not reject the possibility of institutional
duty "to specific individuals or narrow classes of individuals who for some reason were
distinguishable from the mass; we only rejected claims for broad categories of special
relationships which operatively seem to be indistinguishable from a general negligence
theory." Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237. The Court further noted that it does not "apply the
Restatements precise formulation uncritically. Instead, we have taken a policy-based
approach in determining whether a special relation should be said to exist and
consequently whether a duty is owed." Id at 236. Rejecting "the Restatements
mechanistic relational models[,]" kf at 237 n.5, the Court deemed its own narrower
approach more realistic than "a broad reading of the Restatement, especially when one
considers the fact that at bottom, the issue is one of negligence—a lack of reasonable
care—as opposed to what actions of others it would be nice to be insured against." IcL at
237.
As explained in Higgins, the public duty doctrine does not preclude the application
of a reasonable care standard once a duty is shown. Rather, it permits liability under the
reasonable care standard only where a public entity has reason to know that particular
individuals—not a broad class—are placed in unreasonable jeopardy by the entity's action
or inaction. Under Higgins, that duty involves a "pragmatic, policy-based analysis" that is
"consistent with the practical realities" of the parties' relationship. IdL In the present case,
the court of appeals failed to analyze the consequences of imposing a duty on the
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University to prevent an adult student with no apparent or declared disabilities from
slipping and falling on a field trip. It erred in concluding that simply by taking the
student into an allegedly dangerous area, the University necessarily assumed
responsibility for his safety or deprived him of his normal opportunities for selfprotection. See Webb. 2004 UT App 56 at ^| 10 n.6. No such allegations were made in
the complaint.
To predicate a special relationship on nothing more than an adult student's
presence on the site of his injury is to elevate the student-teacher relationship itself to a
special status—a step this Court explicitly declined to take in Beach. Observing that
"colleges and universities are educational institutions, not custodial," 726 P.2d at 419. the
Court explained, "A realistic assessment of the relationship between the parties here
precludes our finding that a special relationship existed between the University and Beach
or other adult students." IdL To declare that a special relationship exists here on the basis
of a single, conclusory allegation that the University was negligent in "taking the class
into a dangerous area[,]" R. 2, ^[ 12, imposes the paternalism Beach rejected and belies the
analytical framework crafted by Beach, Higgins, and other precedents from Utah's
appellate courts. Because it is contrary to decided law, the court of appeals' decision in
this case warrants reversal.
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CONCLUSION
The decision of the court of appeals reaches a result that cannot be sustained in
light of precedent. This Court has consistently upheld the application of the public dutv
doctrine in negligence actions against state entities. The court of appeals' decision throws
settled law into turmoil and upsets the balancing of competing priorities for valuable
public resources, with the potential of making the state a guarantor of every individual's
well-being regardless of circumstances. For these reasons, as more fully explained above,
the University lly requests the Court to reverse the court of appeals' decision, vacate its
opinion, and enter an order affirming the district court's judgment for the University.
Dated this TMU^ day of July, 2004.

due
Nancy t . Kemp
Sandra L. Steinvoort
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee/Petitioner
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I hereby certify that on this 2M>iW day of July, 2004,1 caused to be mailed, first
class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONER
to the following:
Brent Gordon
Driggs, Bills & Day, P.C.
331 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

ADDENDUM A

Kenneth A. Bills (#6835)
DR1GGS. OSBORNL & HUANG
Attorneys lor Plaintiff
331 South 600 East
Sail Lake Cm. Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-9982
I-ax: (801) 363-8370
IN THE I111RD JUDICIAL DJS1RJC1 COURI
IN AND FOR SALT LAKF COUN LY. STATE OF UTAH

JAMES WEBB.
Plaintiff.

The UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a diusion
of the State of Utah. PARK PLAZA
CONDOMINIUM OWNER'S
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit
Corporation, and JONETTE WEBSTER.

COMPLAINT

Case Number:

Judge:

W f f l ^ g ^

rtfyiflfld

Defendants.

Plaintiff. James Webb, by and through his undersigned eounsel of record, complains and
alleges against above named defendants as follows:
1.

Plaintiff James Webb is an indhidual and resident of Salt Lake County. State of

2.

Defendant University of Utah is a governmental entity of the State of Utah.

3.

Defendant Jonette Webster is an individual and resident of Salt Lake County.

Utah.

State of Utah.
4.

Defendant Park Plaza Condominium Owners Association is a non-profit

corporation operating in the State of Utah.

5.

Plaintiffs have complied with all procedural provisions of the Utah's

Governmental Immunity Act.
6.

On or about March 7. 1998. Plaintiff was a student in a class held by Defendant

University of Utah.
7.

As part of the class. Defendant University of Utah had a scheduled "field trip" for

the class that Plaintiff was enrolled in.
8.

The field trip was. in part, to examine various fault lines in the Salt Lake County

9.

As part of the field trip, the students were taken to property owned and under the

area.

control of Defendant Park Plaza Condominiums.
10.

The sidewalks under the control of Defendant Park Plaza Condominiums were

covered with snow and ice.
11.

While standing on the sidewalk. Defendant Jonette Webster slipped on the ice.

and while attempting to steady herself, caused Plaintiff to slip and fall on the concrete.
12.

Defendant University of Utah was negligent included, without limitation, failing

to obtain permission of landowners before taking a class on a scheduled field trip, and taking the
class into a dangerous area.
13.

Defendant Park Plaza Condominiums was negligent in failing to maintain a

reasonable and safe condition on walkways under its control.
14.

Defendant Jonette Webster was negligent in failing to maintain her footing and

falling, and in grabbing the Plaintiff as she slipped, causing Plaintiff to fall.
15.

As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants* negligence, the Plaintiff has

sustained serious injuries to his body and shock and injuries to his system. All of said injuries

have caused and continue to cause the Plaintiff great physical suffering and mental pain and
suffering. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereupon alleges, that said injuries and
said pain and suffering will be pennanent and will result in permanent disability to the Plaintiff
16.

As a further and proximate result of the aforesaid negligence of the Defendants-

Plaintiff has been forced to incur medical bills for medical and hospital attention in an amount
subject to proof at trial.
17.

Plaintiff has suffered special damages in a sum subject to proof at trial.

18.

Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the amount incurred on special damages pursuant

to the applicable statutes of the State of Utah.
WHEREFORE. Plaintiff pray for judgment against the defendants as follows:
1.

For a determination by the Court that the defendants were responsible for the

various injuries suffered by the Plaintiff
2.

For a judgment against the defendants for special damages in a sum subject to

proof at trial, as well as interest thereon.
3.

For general damages against the defendants in a sum subject to proof at trail.

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED this Jg2_ day of August, J 999
BY: DR1GGS. OSBORNE & HUANG

.enneth A. Bills
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiffs Address:
1230 Roosevelt Ave
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

ADDENDUM B

FfiUlJ CIS : ; ' ~ i
Third Judlciii! L;

SANDRA L. STEINVOORT - 5352
Assistant Attorney Genera]
JAN GRAHAM- 1231
Utah Attorney Genera]
160 East 300 South. Sixth Floor
P.O.Box 140856
Sail Lake City. UT 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100
Attorneys for Defendant University of Utah

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

JAMES WEBB.
Plaintiff.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE

vs.
Case No. 990909689
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, a division
of the State of Utah, PARK PLAZA
CONDOMINIUM OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non Profit
Corporation, and JONETTE WEBSTER,

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendants.

The defendant University of Utah's Motion to Dismiss came before the Court on
Monday, January 247 2000. The plaintiff was not present but was represented by counsel,
Kenneth A. Bills. The defendant was represented by Sandra L. Steinvoort Assistant Attorney
General.

The Court having heard argument of counsel, having reviewed the memoranda submitted
by counsel and being fully advised on the matter, now and therefore, hereby ORDER,
ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows:
1.

That the motion to dismiss is granted and the plaintiffs claims against the

defendanl University of Utah are dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this %( day of Qgyfj^

e^^OOO.
BY THE COURT:

^£££
STEPHEN L. HHNRJOD
THIRD D I S T R J I T COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DRJGGS OSBORNE & HUANG

/NNETH A. BILLS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

tt**„

I hereby certify that on this _^*__ day of January. 2000. 1 caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, in the United
States maii. postage prepaid, to the following:
KENNETH A BILLS
DRIGGS OSBORNE & HUANG
331 S600E
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
TERRY M PLANT ESQ.
PLANT WALLACE CHRJSTENSEN & KANELL
4 TRIAD CENTER STE 500
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84180
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PARK PLAZA CONDOMINIUM OWNERS
JOSEPH J JOYCE ESQ.
STRONG AND HANNI
9 EXCHANGE PLACE STE 600
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841 ] 1
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT JONETTE WEBSTER
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"CUKI
Third Jnc.c;ai District
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

>LT

L K

»

^CCo V U

—00O00—

James Webb,

No. 20000181 - S O
Plaintiff and Appellant,

^

09O<?6> flR

V.

The University of Utah, a division of
the state of Utah,

Defendant University of Utah's motion for summary dismissal is granted. The appeal
was taken from a non-final order, as parties remain before the trial court and plaintiff did not
request certification of the dismissal order. The dismissaJ is without prejudice.

BY THE COURT:

im^A
Date

I,y2-OD&
/

•

.

KA^^K^c^
Richard C. Howe
Chief Justice

IN THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OF UTAH
—00O00—

NOTICE OF DECISION
James Webb,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

No. 20000181-SC
990909689

v.
The University of Utah, a division
of the State of Utah, Park Plaza
Condominium Owner's
Association, a Utah Non-Profit
Corporation, and Jonette Webster,
Defendants and Appellee,

The above-entitled case was submitted to the court for decision and the attached order has been
issued.
Order Issued: May 1,2000
Notice of Decision Issued: May 2, 2000
Record:

None

THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
990909689

Pat H. Bartholomew
Clerk of Court

Deputy Clerk

Date

\

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
] hereb) certify that on May 2, 2000, a true and correct cop\ of the foregoing ORDER and a true
and correct copy of the NOTICE OF DECISJON were deposited in the dutcd States mail to the
party(ies) listed below:
SANDRA L. STEJNVOORT
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160E300S6TI1FLR
POBOX 140833
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0833
TERRY M. PLANT
PLANT WALLACE CHRJSTENSEN & KANELL
UNIVERSITY CLUB BUILDING
136 E S TEMPLE STE 1700
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84180
JOSEPH J. JOYCE
STRONG & HANNI
9 EXCHANGE PL STE 600
600 BOSTON BLDG
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
KENNETH A. BILLS
DPJGGS OSBORNE & FIUANG PC
331 S6TH E
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER and the original NOTICE OF DECISION
were placed in Interdepartmental Mail to be delivered to the trial court listed below:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKJ5 CITY UT 84114-1860

Deputy Clerk
Case No.: 20000181-SC
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE , #990909689
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Pauteae Stagg

to^kotthe Court

James Webb,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

ORDER CONSOLIDATING AND
DISMISSING APPEALS
Case No. 20000881-CA
Case No. 20000980-CA

University of Utah, a
division of the State of
Utah,
Defendant and Appellee.

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis.
These cases represent an appeal from a single order of the
trial court and are accordingly consolidated under case number
20000881-CA.
Our review of the record convinces us that this case
involving multiple defendants was not properly certified under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Under the rule, "the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." Here,
although the trial court's order stated that "plaintiff shall
have a final and appealable order, " the court did not make an
express finding that there was no just reason for delay supported
by a statement of the reasons for the finding. Bennion v.
Pennzoil, 826 P.2d 137, 139 (Utah 1992). A judgment is not final
"merely because the order so recites." Little v. Mitchell, 604
P.2d 918, 919 (Utah 1979).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is
dismissed without prejudice.

Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge

i/7
Russell W. Bench, Judge

Plh^
fames

'• the undersigned,
Appeal*, do hereb'
"
fc^Ut true and
com
on file in the w
*hereot I have
the Court

20000881-CA
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

00O00

James Webb,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
University of Utah, a dijvi^sionof the^ State_ ofJJtaJi; Park Plaza
Condominium Owners' Association, a Utah non-profit corporation; and
Jonette Webster,
Defendants and Appellee.

OPINION
For Official Publication)

Case No. 20020985-CA

F I L E D
(March 1 1 , 2 0 0 4 )
2004 UT App 56

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod
Attorneys: Brent Gordon, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff, Sandra L. Steinvoort, and Nancy L. Kemp, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee
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Before Judges Billings, Bench, and
BILLINGS,

Presiding

Thome.

Judge:

%\ James Webb appeals the trial court's order granting the
University of Utah's (University) m o t i o n to dismiss pursuant to rule
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil P r o c e d u r e . We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND11'
%2 Webb was a student in an earth s c i e n c e course at the
University. As part of the course curriculum, s t u d e n t s were required
to attend an off-campus field trip to e x a m i n e fault lines in the Salt
Lake County area. During the t r i p , W e b b and other s t u d e n t s w e r e
directed to walk through a c o n d o m i n i u m complex to examine a
particular fault line. The sidewalks w i t h i n this p r i v a t e residential
property were covered with snow and ice, and as W e b b and o t h e r s
walked on the sidewalks toward the viewing area, one of W e b b ' s fellow
students lost her footing on the slippery surface. To steady h e r s e l f ,
she grabbed onto Webb for support and caused Webb to slip on the i c e ,
fall to the ground, and sustain i n j u r i e s .
13 Webb filed suit against the U n i v e r s i t y and o t h e r s , alleging
that the University was negligent by d i r e c t i n g students into a
"dangerous area" on a school-organized field trip. The U n i v e r s i t y
m o v e d to dismiss, arguing that no special r e l a t i o n s h i p existed
b e t w e e n W e b b and the University that gave rise to a duty on the part
of the University. The trial court agreed and dismissed W e b b ' s claims
against the University on that ground a l o n e . Webb a p p e a l s .

ISSUE A N D S T A N D A R D O F REVIEW
54 W e b b contends that the trial court erred by d i s m i s s i n g h i s
claims against the University w h e n it concluded that the U n i v e r s i t y
owed Webb no duty. A rule 12(b)(6) m o t i o n to d i s m i s s "is a p p r o p r i a t e
only where it clearly appears that the p l a i n t i f f . . . would not be
entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of
facts [the plaintiff] could p r o v e to support the[] c l a i m . " Prows v.
S t a t e , 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1 9 9 1 ) . "Because the p r o p r i e t y of a 12
(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, w e give the trial c o u r t ' s
ruling no deference and review it under a c o r r e c t n e s s s t a n d a r d . " St.
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. S t . B e n e d i c t ' s H o s p . , 811 P.2d 1 9 4 , 196 (Utah
1 9 9 1 ) . "The issue of whether a duty e x i s t s is e n t i r e l y a q u e s t i o n of
law to be determined by the c o u r t . " Ferree v. S t a t e , 784 P.2d 149,
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151 (Utah 1989).

ANALYSIS
15 "[T]o prevail upon a negligence claim under Utah law, a
plaintiff must establish, among other things, that the defendant owed
him or her a duty of care." Youn.9__yv Salt Lake...Ci_ty_S_ch_. Dist., 2002
UT 64,112, 52 P.3d 1230. Webb characterizes the University's duty of
care as a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care when
directing its students to take a certain route on a required field
trip. The University characterizes the duty differently, as a duty to
protect Webb from the icy conditions at the condominium complex. The
University then argues that because the duty is a duty to protect,
Webb must establish a special relationship between himself and the
University, which Webb has not. The trial court agreed with the
University and found that the University did not owe Webb a duty to
protect him from the icy conditions.
16 We disagree that Webb must demonstrate a special relationship
with the University.1"7 The duty alleged in Webb's complaint is not a
duty to protect, but rather the University's duty not to act
negligently in providing instruction. Specifically, Webb alleges that
the University directed him to enter a dangerous area on a schoolsponsored and required field trip. Thus, this is not a case where a
failure to act is alleged.----•- Therefore, the special duty doctrine
relied upon by the University is not helpful.-—' See Hunsaker v.
State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993) (finding no special duty to
protect a member of the general public from a paroled violent felon);
Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah 1993} (finding
no special duty to protect a member of the general public from a
discharged mental patient); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1161
(Utah 1991) (finding no special duty to protect a member of the
general public from an escaped mental patient); Ferree v. State, 784
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (finding no special duty to protect a
member of the general public from a prisoner on weekend release);
Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1984) (finding no
special duty to protect a member of the general public from a drunk
driver who had been stopped by the police).
17 Further, we conclude that this case is distinct from Beach v.
University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986). In Beach, a student
brought suit against the University for injuries she had sustained
when she fell from a cliff during a weekend field trip. See id. at
414. The fall occurred while Beach was voluntarily intoxicated and
after the daily course work had been completed. See id. On her way to
her tent at night, Beach became disoriented and subsequently fell
from the cliff. See id. at 415. Beach argued that the University was
negligent by failing "to supervise and protect her." Id. The Utah
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Supreme Court disagreed. It first recognized that M[t]he lav; imposes
upon one party an affirmative duty to act only when certain special
relationships exist between the parties." Id. The court then
concluded that because "Beach's situation was not distinguishable
from that of the other students on the trip . . . no special
relationship arose between the University and Beach." Id. at 416.
Thus, "the University had no affirmative obligation to protect or
supervise [Beach] and no duty was breached." Id.
SI8 The crucial difference between Beach and the facts in this case
is that Webb's fall occurred while Webb was acting pursuant to
instructions given by the University during course work. The
University directed Webb to cross the condominium complex, whereas
Beach was acting on her own when she fell. Beach claimed that the
University had a special duty to protect her from her own actions,
but the court found otherwise. We cannot ignore this distinction. Had
Beach fallen from the cliff after her instructor had directed all the
students to cross a treacherous path on the edge of the cliff, Beach
certainly could have stated a negligence claim against the University
even though Beach's situation was not distinguishable from that of
the other students. While the University does not have a custodial
relationship with its students, see id. at 418, the University does
owe a duty to exercise ordinary and reasonable care when it
affirmatively acts in directing its students to perform certain tasks
as part of its curriculum.x '
59 A second case involving the University, Cannon v_1 University of
Utah, 866 P.2d 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), also supports our result. In
CAnJ22n, this court upheld summary judgment for the University where
the plaintiffs were injured in an auto-pedestrian accident when they
used an off-campus crosswalk - just off University property while
walking to a University sporting event. See id. at 587-88. The
Cannons alleged that the University police were negligent because,
prior to the Cannons' arrival, the officers had ceased directing
traffic and were simply sitting in the police car. See id. at 588. We
recognized that "the officers did not owe any specific duty to the
Cannons which they did not already owe to the general public." _IdL a t
590. Accordingly, we held that the University had no special
^relationship with, and thus owed no duty to, the Cannons. See id.
510 However, in reaching our conclusion we stated, "it is
important to note that the Cannons did not rely on the aid of the
officers when they attempted to cross the street." Id. In other
itfords, it was crucial that the officers were not directing the
Cannons into the dangerous area. In this case, Webb alleges that he
crossed the condominium complex because the University directed
.students to do so- Just as the officers in Cannon would have owed a
duty to use ordinary and reasonable care if they had aided the
Cannons across the street, the University owed a duty to Webb to use
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ordinary and reasonable care when directing Webb to walk across the
condominium complex.' ; Thus, the trial court erred when it concluded
that the University, as a matter of law, owed no duty to Webb.

CONCLUSION
Sill The University owes its students the duty to exercise ordinary
and reasonable care when it directs students to engage in specific
activities as part of its educational instruction. Webb alleged that
the University failed to exercise such care when it instructed him to
cross an allegedly dangerous condominium complex as a part of a
required field trip. Thus, the trial court erred when it concluded
that the University owed no duty to Webb.-7' Accordingly, we reverse
and remand.

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

112 WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench,
Associate Presiding Judge

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
1. "When determining whether a trial court properly granted a rule 12
(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to
be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." St.
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah
1991)- We state the facts of this case accordingly.
2. Webb also claims that he contracted with the University for the
performance of a service and, therefore, "[ujnder fundamental
principles of tort law, the University owed [him] a duty . . . to act
as a reasonably prudent person when it undertook . . . [to] provid[e]
educational instruction." However, Webb failed to preserve this issue
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by raising it in the trial court. Webb does not argue plain error or
exceptional circumstances. Absent plain error or exceptional
circumstances, Utah appellate courts will not decide issues that are
raised for the first time on appeal. See Chapma^
2003 UT App 383,110, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 45. Hence, we do not reach
the merits of Webb's contract argument.
3. The distinction between act and omission applies generally and
determines whether a plaintiff must demonstrate a special
relationship to maintain a negligence claim. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts §§ 302, 314 (1965); see also Beach v. University of Utah,
726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §
314(a) (1964), for guidance).
4. Were Webb alleging that the University was negligent by failing to
control his fellow student who caused Webb to fall, the University
would be correct that the "failure to protect" line of cases applies.
5. The Arizona Court of Appeals distinguished Breach in a similar way.
See Delbridqe v. Maricopa County, 893 P.2d 55, 59 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994) (distinguishing "non-curricular activities" from those
"supervised by the instructor and included in the curriculum").
6. Because we recognize that the line between the University acting
and the University protecting its students is not always easy to
draw, we note that were a special relationship required in this case,
the facts alleged by Webb are sufficient to establish a special
relationship. Where one party controls another party's acts, a
special relationship exists because the controlling party "assumes
responsibility for another's safety or deprives another of his or her
normal opportunities for self-protection." Beach v. University of
Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986) (citing Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 314(A) (1964)). "Determining whether one party has an
affirmative duty to protect another . . . requires careful
consideration of the consequences for the parties and society at
large." Id. at 418. Failure to find a special relationship under the
facts of this case would permit the University to escape all
liability when it injures students by requiring them to engage in
activities fraught with unreasonable risks. Such adverse consequences
for society would require that we find a special relationship in
these circumstances.
7. Because we review only whether the University owed Webb a duty, we
express no opinion whether the facts alleged are sufficient to
demonstrate a breach of that duty or a sufficient causal link leading
to Webb's injuries. For instance, if there were safe routes across
the condominium complex, but Webb chose a dangerous path, it would
not necessarily follow that the University directed Webb into a
dangerous area.

